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Abstract
Lifetime tenure maximizes judicial independence by shielding judges from political
pressures, but it creates problems of its own. As is widely known, judges with judicial
independence may implement their political preferences or shirk in other ways. Less
attention has been given to another problem: that judges will remain in office after their
abilities degrade as a result of old age. The U.S. federal system addresses these problems
in an indirect way. When judges’ pensions vest, they receive a full salary regardless of
whether they work or not; thus, the effective compensation for judicial work falls to zero.
Judges can retire, receive their pension, and obtain paying work elsewhere. This approach
limits some of the harmful effects of judicial independence by encouraging judges to
vacate their offices when they reach a certain age, and by causing judges who lack talent,
and therefore find their work burdensome, to self-select themselves out of office. But this
solution is hardly perfect. Wealthier judges will be insulated from the financial
incentives, and judges with strong partisan preferences can time their retirement for
political purposes. We test the potential benefits and costs of this system using a database
of federal district judges.
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1.

Introduction

Judicial independence is the centerpiece of liberal democracy. In the United
States, the founders secured judicial independence by placing the judiciary in a coequal
branch of government, protecting judicial pay, and providing for lifetime tenure.
Lifetime tenure was crucial: if elected officials such as the president could remove judges
who displease them, then judges would be afraid to rule independently.
But lifetime tenure has a conspicuous disadvantage: old judges whose skills have
eroded cannot be removed from office. Because of advances in longevity, a judge
appointed today at the age of 50 can expect to live until the age of 80.9, and hence
potential de facto term of 30.9 years.2 We do not have comparable figures for the
eighteenth century but we know that life expectancy at birth was much shorter than it is
today—only 56 years for men (Fogel 2004; 2). The first twenty Supreme Court justices
died at an average age of 69.7. A sample of twenty Supreme Court justices and circuit
court judges who died in recent years indicates an average age of death of 79.6, a
difference of nearly a decade.3
This is a problem for several reasons.4 First, if, as appears to be the case, medical
technology keeps people alive longer but is not as good at preventing the deterioration of
their mental faculties, then judges with eroded skills will stay in office longer today than
they did in the past.5 Second, judges whose judicial philosophies or political
commitments are mainstream when they are appointed may linger in office long after
those philosophies and commitments lose their respectability. Many commentators argue
that presidents should have the option to appoint like-minded judges, which they cannot
very often if judges stay in office for long periods of time (Crampton & Carrington
2005).
The contrast with private employment is instructive: private employers fire
employees when their skills degrade. The founders rejected this approach for judges
because it would compromise judicial independence. If politicians enjoy the power to
fire incompetent judges, they can use that power to fire politically inconvenient judges.
The impeachment power offered a third way, but it has turned out to be too difficult to
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U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 76 (2011
ed.), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0102.pdf (last visited Jan. 30,
2010).
3
Authors’ calculations based on data from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Biographical
Directory of Federal Judges, available at
www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/BiographicalDirectoryOfJudges.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
4
As urged by a number of scholars, who believe that Supreme Court justices stay in office for too long.
See, e.g., Crampton & Carrington (2005); Calabresi & Lindgren (2005).
5
As suggested anecdotally by Goldstein (2011), which notes that 12 percent of sitting federal district and
circuit judges are 80 years older, and that the fraction of judges 80 and older has doubled in the last twenty
years.
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use, and has largely been directed against judges who commit crimes.6
Other systems address the problem of judicial independence and competence in
different ways. In many states and most foreign countries, judges either receive fixed
terms or are subject to a retirement age. These approaches are crude but effective ways
to remove incompetent judges. But they are not costless. If a judge has a single term,
then a highly competent and experienced judge cannot be retained. If the judge has a
renewable term, then she might decide cases so as to please her political masters—
judicial independence is compromised (e.g., Shepherd 2009). Mandatory retirement also
deprives the state of judges who are experienced and whose abilities have not yet eroded.
The U.S. federal system has evolved an approach for removing incompetent
judges despite lifetime tenure. It operates on the carrot principle. Rather than removing
judges who reach a certain age, the system indirectly bribes judges to leave office or take
a reduced workload when they reach a certain age or level of experience.7 When judges
reach the age of 65, they become subject to the Rule of 80. Under the Rule of 80, a judge
receives a full pension—equal to his or her salary—when the judge’s age and the judge’s
years of experience on the bench equal 80. For example, a 65 year old judge with 15
years on the bench qualifies under the Rule of 80, as does a 70 year old judge with 10
years on the bench.8
It is important to understand that because a judge receives full pay upon satisfying
the Rule of 80, the judge has no pecuniary reason to stay in office. The judge may
continue to serve, but does not receive any dollars for doing work. In effect, the judge’s
salary is reduced to $0. In addition, a judge who leaves office can earn more money in
the private sector or simply enjoy leisure with no monetary penalty. And judges who
take their pension pay are exempt from FICA and Medicare payments (in some states,
they are also exempt from state and city income taxes) (Block 2007; 539). In sum, the
financial benefits to leaving office are quite considerable for a federal judge.
The judge who decides to leave office (“active status”) faces a further choice: to
remain on senior status with a reduced workload or to resign. A judge on senior status
usually has a reduced caseload (down to 25 percent of the normal caseload).9 Table 1
summarizes the effects of these choices (assuming the Rule of 80 is satisfied).
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Only a handful of federal judges have ever been impeached. And over the past half century, every one of
them has been removed for what either was or would have constituted criminal behavior. See
Impeachments of Federal Judges (available at
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html ) (last visited February 5, 2011).
7
There are also informal means of pressure, as described in Goldstein, supra.
8
See 28 USC § 371(e)(1).
9
See 28 USC § 371(e)(1). We have been told, anecdotally, that requirement that the senior judge do at least
25% of the work that an active judge does is not always strictly adhered to. Judges, at least in some
jurisdictions, are allowed to fulfill their obligations as seniors in a variety of ways, including by doing
administrative work. See Stras & Scott (2007; 537) (describing the “bureaucratic senior judge”).
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Table 1
Salary
Tax Benefits
Private Sector Pay
Accoutrements of
Power10
Caseload
Political Effects

Active Judge
Full
No
No
Yes

Senior Judge
Full
Yes
No
Partial

Resigned
Full
Yes
Yes
No

Full
N/A

Partial (25 to 100%)
Creates vacancy (an
extra spot)

None
Creates vacancy (not an
extra spot)

The incentives created by this system are more complex than they first appear. A
judge who seeks to maximize her pecuniary return would resign rather than take senior
status because resignation permits her to earn income in the private sector. A judge who
cares at least a little about money should prefer senior to active status because of the
considerable financial benefits. However, that judge’s status will be somewhat reduced.
At the appeals court level, the judge no longer sits on en banc panels and does not have
the right to assign opinions. At the district court level, there are fewer concrete effects,
but there may be a diminishment in status – others may read the choice to take senior
status as a sign that the judge has diminished in capacity.11 Finally, a judge who wants to
increase the representation of her party on the bench does best by taking senior status
(while a same-party president is in office) so that she remains on the bench while a new
position is created.12 If the judge resigned, the temporary extra position would not be
created.
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Office, robe, honorific, etc.
See Block (2007; 533) (noting the reluctance of some law students to apply to senior judges for
clerkships). Along these lines, one of the pieces of advice that one law school provides to law students
thinking of applying for clerkships is that “The judge's senior status may reduce competition for these
clerkships”. See St. Louis University Law School Clerkship Website (available at
http://law.slu.edu/careers/opportunities/judicial_clerkships.html ).
12
An intriguing possibility here that is that a judge choosing whether to take senior status might be able to
negotiate whether or not he wishes to take that status as a function of who is likely to be appointed to
replace him. One senior judge explicitly acknowledged that part of his decision as to whether he was going
to take senior status was a function of who the likely candidates were to replace him. Of his choice to take
senior status, he explained:
This reality required me to decide whether I would defer taking senior status until it was more
likely that my successor would be of my political persuasion, which would require waiting until
one of the Democratic Senators had a pick or a Democrat might be elected President
three years hence. . . . . My decision to take senior status would not therefore be driven by my
personal political beliefs but rather by the hope that my successor would meet that standard
of excellence.
My hope for such a successor was soon realized when the governor’s office told me that the
governor had two candidates whom he would recommend to the White House to fill my vacancy
should I take senior status: One was a former law clerk of mine and one of the very best; the other
was also known by me to be extraordinarily well-qualified. I had no trouble “making way” for
either candidate, and I immediately submitted my letter to the President taking senior status. The
Governor quickly sent both candidates to Washington, D.C. to be interviewed by the White House
Counsel’s Office, and one of them, Brian Cogan, now Judge Cogan, soon became my successor.
Block (2007; 545); cf. Stras & Scott (2007; 470) (describing the deal that was struck on the Ninth Circuit
where Judge Betty Fletcher took senior status in order for her son, William Fletcher, to be able to get
confirmation).
11
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Recall that the purpose of this system is to encourage judges to stop judicial work
as their ability erodes. Will it? Let us compare this system to a baseline system where
judges work until a mandatory retirement age of 70. Evaluation of this system is
straightforward. It removes judges who would become incompetent after age 70, but it
also removes judges who would remain competent after age 70 and does not remove
judges who became incompetent before age 70. These false positive and false negative
costs may well be high.
By contrast, the current system encourages elderly judges to take senior status or
to resign but does not compel them to. It seems to assume that judges will enjoy their
work most when their abilities are sharp. As their abilities decline, the burden of work
will mount, and hence the incentive to quit will increase. The retirement system removes
the pecuniary incentive to remain a judge beyond this point (as long as the Rule of 80 is
satisfied). The main advantage of this system, compared to mandatory retirement, is that
judges who remain sharp beyond the age of 70 will be less tempted to resign, and thus
will continue to contribute to the judicial system—if need be, on a reduced basis. In
addition, incompetent judges over 65 who have satisfied the Rule of 80 will be tempted to
resign.
However, the assumption that competence and desire to work as a judge are
positively correlated might be wrong. Judges might enjoy their status, or they might
derive utility from exercising power or influencing policy—and they might do so
regardless of their declining competence. Indeed, the mental erosion that ought to
compel a judge to resign or take senior status might blind her of the need to do so.
Another cost is that the system gives judges the power to influence the composition of the
bench. If a judge resigns or takes senior status, the president appoints a replacement. If
the judge does not approve of the politics of the existing president, she may hang on until
the next; if she does approve of the politics of the existing president, she may be sure to
resign or take senior status while that president is still in office. In an unusually clear
example of this phenomenon, Judge U.W. Clemon wrote in his resignation letter to
President Obama: “When it became clear to me last spring that Almighty God had
ordained you as the next president of this great nation, I delayed my retirement so that
you would appoint my replacement.”13
Finally, because the current retirement system exerts influence by pecuniary
means, its effects on judicial incentives may vary with the wealth of legal skill of judges.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some former judges are well-paid arbitrators or law
firm partners;14 in a number of cases, judges have cited financial considerations as
reasons to resign.15 Thus, the retirement system may provide less of an incentive to


13

Letter from Judge U.W. Clemons to President Barack Obama, January 20, 2009, available at
http://blog.al.com/bn/2009/01/Resignationletter.pdf. In a survey of judges asking whether political factors
influence their decision to take senior status, 81 percent said no, 16 percent said yes, and 3 percent said
maybe. Yoon (2005, 528).
14
Using web searches, we have found information on 22 judges in our dataset who resigned or retired and
then took what appear to be highly paid jobs at prestigious firms or set up arbitration practices.
15
See, e.g., Lattman (2007).
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wealthy judges to resign or take senior status than to average judges. It also may be the
case that outside job options will be more available to the judges who were more
influential and demonstrated greater legal skill when they were active judges. On the flip
side, those judges who were better at the job may be the ones who enjoyed it more and,
therefore, might be the least willing to exit via either senior status or resignation.
So much for theory. In this paper, we test some of these ideas by statistically
examining the retirement decisions of a large dataset of federal district judges. We find
both that the system works as advertised—pecuniary incentives to take senior status (but
not to resign) are effective—and that its incidental costs are real. Judges do time their
retirement decisions for political reasons, and wealthy judges are not sensitive to
pecuniary incentives. Most interesting, these effects operate differently across types of
judges. Judges who work harder and are better at their jobs are less likely to respond to
financial and political incentives to retire.
2.

Literature Review and Hypotheses

The judicial behavior literature has uncovered evidence that judges decide cases
in a way that at least partly advances their ideological preferences. This evidence has led
scholars to examine whether judges’ political preferences influence other decisions they
make, including the timing of their retirements. On this view, judges should try to take
senior status when a like-minded president holds office and thus will have the
opportunity to appoint ideologically similar replacement, or when legal or institutional
changes make it difficult for them to satisfy their political preferences. Judges are human
beings as well as political animals, so retirement may be influenced by factors that
contribute to their well-being—including judicial pay, opportunities for higher pay in the
private sector, and similar compensation and quality-of-life issues. Vesting of one’s
pension through satisfaction of the Rule of 80 should increase the probability of taking
senior status or resigning.
Barrow & Zuk (1990) found evidence that district judges time their move to
senior status in order to open up vacancies for same-party presidents. Spriggs &
Wahlbeck (1995) also found evidence for this political Timing Effect; they also found
evidence that judges take senior status when their pensions vest. Baker (2000) also found
some evidence of the political Timing Effect. However, all three of these papers are
vulnerable to methodological criticisms.16 More recent work using more appropriate
models and more control variables has found little evidence of Timing Effects. This
work includes Boylan (2004), who instead finds that the introduction of the Sentencing
Guidelines, which reduced judicial discretion, increased the probability of judicial
retirement,17 and Yoon (2005, 2006), who instead finds strong evidence for Pension
Effects. A recent study by Hansford et al. (2010) finds that only judges eligible for
retirement are influenced by Timing Effects; pre-pension-eligible judges, by contrast,
hope to be elevated to the circuit court, and so retire if they are too frequently passed


16

For criticisms, see Yoon (2005, 503-05; 2006, 149-150); Boylan (2004, 251).
But because Boylan (2004) tests the effect of the sentencing guidelines by using post 1989 [] as a dummy
variable, he actually just captures a time trend which is open to multiple interpretations.

17
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over, regardless of the political party of the president.18
We build on this work in several ways. First, the previous work does not
distinguish judges according to their abilities; we examine how judges of different
abilities respond to the incentives created by the retirement system. Second, the prior
work does little to distinguish resignation and senior status, which we also examine.
Third, we use a new dataset that contains the retirement decisions over the last ten
years—the older studies use larger data sets but from farther in the past.
3.

Judicial Ability and Institutional Design

Given the wide variation in terms of the both the local processes used for
selecting nominees for judicial positions and the variety of reasons why someone might
get nominated, there is likely to be wide variance in the types of lawyers who get
appointed to be judges. At one extreme, there will be dedicated public servants and
exceptional intellects and at the other there will be purely political appointments. There
will be former law firm partners and also lawyers for indigents. And, at least in today’s
world, there will be a diversity of race and gender. The lore on judicial behavior suggests
three broad judicial types. (1) Time-servers are those who see judging as a secure, highstatus, and well-paying job but not as a source of intellectual enjoyment. (2) Politicians
are those who see judging as an opportunity to implement their moral and political
preferences. (3) Intellects are those who derive enjoyment from judging, either because of
the intellectual challenges or because of the opportunity to do justice.
We predict that time-servers will be more sensitive to the financial incentives
created by the judicial retirement system than are politicians and intellects. Politicians
will be most likely to take advantage of the power to time retirement so as to give a sameparty president the opportunity to appoint a like-minded replacement. Intellects will be
insensitive to both types of incentives.
To test these hypotheses, we need a set of proxies that plausibly separate out the
judges who enjoy their jobs or are more dedicated to them from the others.
Publication Rate: We define Publication Rate as the number of published
opinions for a judge in 2001 and 2002 divided by the average number of filings per judge
in that judge’s district (total filings for the district divided by number of judgeships in
that district).19
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Other studies have examined the retirement decisions of circuit judges and supreme court justices, with
similarly mixed results; see Lindgren & Stolzenberg (2010).
19
By published opinions, we mean opinions that are available in the published reports issued by Westlaw.
Although Westlaw can publish whatever opinions it wants to publish, anecdotal reports suggest that
Westlaw simply publishes whatever opinions judges choose to designate as published opinions. In recent
years, because of the widespread availability of judicial decisions on the electronic databases, and
particularly the passage of the E-Government Act, the distinction between published and unpublished
opinions may have become less important. However, we suspect that the choice to send an opinion for
inclusion in the print version is still an important one that reveals information about the case in question
and the judge. That said, we constrain our data base of opinions to roughly the period immediately prior to
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Positive Citations: We define Positive Citations as the average number of
positive outside-circuit citations (including federal appellate and trial courts, and state
courts) to a judge’s published opinions from 2001 and 2002 as tracked by Westlaw.
Affirmance Rates: Judges will vary in terms of their rates of affirmance by the
appeals court. We define the affirmance rates for a judge as the number of non-overruled
published opinions, including non-appeal opinions, divided by the total number of
published opinions in 2001 and 2002.20 The normal intuition might be the judges with
low affirmances are likely to be worse (time servers); after all, they are getting reversed
more. However, judges have a degree of control over how to explain their decisions and
can influence the likelihood of reversal (for example, by deciding whether to publish an
opinion or not--unpublished opinions are much less likely to get reversed). Hence, other
things equal, a lower affirmance rate might indicate a higher degree of engagement; that
is, a willingness to take risks. In prior research looking at the decisions of district judges
on preliminary motions, we find some results consistent with this premise (Choi, Gulati
& Posner 2011).
Term Clerks versus Permanent Clerks: Judges can choose to hire either single
“term” clerks (short duration clerks, who are usually right out of law school) or multiple
term, often “permanent” clerks. Hiring single term-clerks is usually going to result in
more work for the judge because he has to retrain a fresh group of clerks every year.
Judges who are able to easily handle their work and enjoy training young lawyers,
however, will happily do this extra work. By contrast, the judges who find the job to be
difficult and who need clerks who can do their work for them (in effect, functioning as a
junior judge) will be more likely to use a longer-term or permanent clerk.21 We assume
that intellects are more likely to hire term-clerks (that is, one-year clerks).22

the passage of the E-Government Act in late 2002. See E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107-347,
116 Stat. 2899, 44 U.S.C. § 101, H.R. 2458/S. 803) (enacted December 17, 2002, with an effective date for
most provisions of April 17, 2003).
20
We also collected data on appeal rates for individual judges from Westlaw. However, the data here are
particularly noisy because of large variation in particular types of frivolous appeals.
21
It has been suggested, along these lines, that the availability of law clerks enables judges with
diminishing capacities to stay at the job longer than they might otherwise be able to. Makar (1997); Posner
(1995; 181). It stands to reason, therefore, that that particular effect is more likely to operate with the use
of permanent clerks than with the use of term clerks.
22
We base this assumption on conversations with federal judges. One district judge told us: “judges who
pick [long] term clerks are less ambitious and less confident of their own ability (in my view)…. Smartest
clerks are [short] term clerks. Smart hard working judges, who are ambitious and not dependent on their
clerks intellectually, want: smart clerks who might end up in leadership/leading positions in government,
private practice, the academy, etc.” Along these lines, other researchers report both the view that shortterm clerks are perceived to be smarter and that the longer term clerks are better able to substitute for the
judge. Take the following passage:
One of our subjects recounted with evident distaste how it had been widely rumored among the
bar that the decisions and opinions of one of the career-clerks-equipped district judges were the
product of the clerks rather than the judge. One of the district judges’ clerks with whom we spoke
described his co-clerk [a career clerk]. . . as more concerned with “efficiency” and less inclined to
“discursive discussion” than the other clerks . . . the career clerk was also said to be very good at
predicting the behavior of his judge.
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Clerks from Top Law Schools: Judges have considerable discretion in the
selection of their law clerks. Given the high status associated with a federal clerkship,
federal judges tend to be overwhelmed with applicants. A judge, in choosing her clerks,
can hire the best applicants and that is what she would do if she wanted the best team
possible to assist her. However, the judge might also choose to give out her clerkships
as, favors to the children of her friends, rewards to students who signal a clear particular
political bent, presents to one’s alma mater. One way to examine whether a judge is
more likely to be using her clerk hiring to satisfy personal preferences rather than
improving the quality of the work being produced is to look at the fraction of a judge’s
clerks who have attended one the top fifteen law schools. We assume that every federal
district judge, no matter how obscure, can hire a law clerk who finished near the top of
the class at a top 15 law school. If the judge is hiring from below the top 15 schools as a
systematic matter, that suggests that the judge is less interested in the quality of work
product out of the chambers. Such a judge, we predict, is more likely to respond to
inducements such as the Rule of 80 and the prospect of furthering policy preferences. As
our measure of the fraction of top law school clerks, we compute the fraction of clerks
from top law schools for each judge from 1996 to 2000.
We assume that intellect-type judges have higher publication rates, positive
citations, and single-term clerk rates as well as greater fraction of top law-school clerks.
We are less clear on the relationship between low affirmance rates and intellect-type
judges--high numbers of reversals may indicate a problem with a judge’s decisionmaking
or it may also indicate a judge more willing to take risks with their decisions.
We also look at variables that help us identify judges who are time-servers or
politicians, or that otherwise shed light on the incentives created by the judicial
retirement system.
Wealth: Judges who are wealthy should care little about the Rule of 80. These
wealthy judges are not there because of the attractive retirement benefits that a federal
judgeship provides. And therefore, we predict that wealthier judges should be less
responsive to this particular inducement.
Politics: Judges who are of the opposite party from the president may seek to
stay active longer than they would otherwise. Once a same party president takes office,
such judges may then have a discontinuously greater change of leaving active status.
Climate: Judges who do not enjoy the business of judging may be more likely to
leave active status when the opportunity cost of remaining a judge is high. One
opportunity cost is the ability to enjoy good weather outside of the judge’s chambers. We
assume that this weather effect will have relatively little impact at younger ages, when
the judge has only recently joined the bench. After all, the judge would have been aware
of the weather conditions in her particular location. However, age can make a cold

Oakley & Thompson (1980; 104).
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weather climate less attractive. We predict that as a judge ages, a cold weather climate
will become increasingly correlated with a greater propensity to leave active status.
In addition to the above factors, we also look at a number of other demographic
factors such as race, gender, age, prior occupation (as a judge, prosecutor, private
practitioner), and whether one attended a top law school. These are all variables that
could influence the choice to retire, although it is not clear that these variables would
necessarily separate out our judges in terms of their susceptibility to the Rule of 80 and
the opportunity to influence the politics of their successors. Hence we use these as
control variables.
4.

Dataset

Our dataset consists of information about the decisionmaking of all of the federal
district judges who held office in 2001 or 2002 (developed in Choi, Gulati, and Posner
(2011)). We focus only on those judges who were not senior for at least part of the time
in 2001 or 2002. This leaves us with 596 initially active district judges. Most of the
judges in our sample were appointed in 2000 or earlier (95.5%). Some were initially
appointed in 2001 (2.0%) and 2002 (2.5%). We track our initial set of active judges from
2000 to 2010.
Table 2 describes our sample of judges. The circuit with the most federal district
judges is the Ninth Circuit (85 judges). The circuit with the least is the D.C. Circuit (13
judges). Of the 596 judges who were initially active in our sample, 55.7% were still
active at the end of 2010. We focus in this study on voluntary judicial departures—
either through resignation (2.0% of the sample) or taking senior status (37.8% of the
sample). A small number of judges left involuntarily—either through death (2.0%) or
impeachment (0.2%). A small fraction of judges were also elevated to a higher court
(the federal court of appeals) (2.4%).
The fraction of the sample that departs voluntarily varies in a relatively narrow
range from 2001 to 2008 (from 8.4% to 11.4%). In 2009, the year following Barack
Obama’s election, however, the fraction of the total sample that departs jumps to 16.9%
(the highest fraction for all sample years). In 2010, the fraction drops to 6.3% (the
smallest fraction in all sample years).
5.

Tests

We begin by testing for whether the Rule of 80 and the Timing effects that prior
researchers have found evidence of, albeit not uniformly, show up in our data as well.
Those effects do indeed show up. We then move to examining whether the two effects
operate differently on different subsets of judges.
5.1.

The Rule of 80 and Judicial Quality
For our Rule of 80 test, we define Rule80, a time varying covariate, as equal to 1
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if the judge meets the rule of 80 in the year in question or the next year and 0 otherwise.
We exclude those judges who leave active status involuntarily (either through death or
impeachment). We also exclude judges who are elevated to a higher court. We therefore
test the voluntary decision on the part of district judges either to remain in active status as
a district judge or to resign or take senior status.
The judge characteristics we assess include whether the judge is female (Female),
black (Black), and of another minority race other than Black (Other Race). We also look
at the age (Age) and number of years of federal judicial experience (Experience) of the
judge in the year in question.
Next, we tabulate whether the judge was employed immediately before becoming
a federal district judge as a state court judge or magistrate (Prior Judge), a prosecutor
(Prior Prosecutor), or in private practice (Prior Private Practice). Finally, we look at
whether the judge graduated from Harvard, Yale, or Stanford Law School (Top School).
Collectively, we refer to these variables as the Judge Characteristic variables. Table 3
provides summary statistics on the Judge Characteristic variables as well as other
independent variables used in the paper’s tests. The Appendix provides a description of
the variables.
For our test, we employ a Cox proportional hazard model. The dependent
variable is the number of years (from the start of the study period in 2000) until a judge
chooses to leave active status. For judges who remain active at the end of our study time
period in 2010, the number of survival years is equal to 10 (the number of years from
2000 to 2010). For each judge, the dataset contains separate observations for each year
of survival containing both time-invariant characteristics of the judge (including Female,
Black, Other Race, Prior Judge, Prior Prosecutor, Prior Private Practice, and Top School)
and time-varying characteristics (including Age and Experience). The Cox proportional
hazard model we estimate is as follows:
h(t, X) = h0(t)ex'β
In the Cox hazard model, h(t, X) is the hazard rate. The Cox model is
semiparametric and does not require us to make assumptions about the baseline hazard
rate, h0(t). In the Cox model, X represents the vector of regressors and β is a vector of
estimated coefficients. For our first model, we include our Judge Characteristic variables
as regressors, including Female, Black Other Race, Age, Experience, Prior Judge, Prior
Prosecutor, Prior Private Practice, and Top School. We also include the Rule80 variable.
Model 1 of Table 4 reports the results. The model reports the hazard ratio for
each independent variable. The hazard ratio represents a multiplier relative to the
baseline hazard rate. A hazard ratio of more than 1 represents a positive effect on the
odds of a judge choosing to leave the bench. Conversely, a hazard ratio of less than 1
represents a negative effect on these odds.
We construct two additional models to test whether judges with varying quality
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(along the dimensions we measure) respond differently to the Rule of 80. In Model 2 of
Table 4, we include an indicator variable for whether the judge’s Publication Rate is at
the 75th percentile or lower for our sample judges (Low Publication Rate). We also
include an interaction term between Rule80 and Low Publication Rate to assess the
particular impact of the Rule of 80 on such judges. In Model 3 of Table 4, we include an
indicator variable for whether the judge’s Positive Citations is at the 75th percentile or
lower for our sample judges (Low Positive Citations). We also include an interaction
term between Rule80 and Low Positive Citations. We select the 75th percentile to
separate out the top 25 percent of judges who are more likely to be “superstar” judges.
The judicial behavior literature indicates that superstar judges may have discontinuously
greater publication and citations numbers compared with non-superstar judges.23 Unlike
Model 1, we estimate Models 2 and 3 only for those judges still active at the beginning of
2003 to avoid possible endogeneity problems with Low Publication Rate and Low
Positive Citations which are both determined based on opinions published in 2001 and
2002.
In all three models, the hazard ratio for Female is less than 1 (ranging in
significance from the 5% to 10% levels), indicating that female judges are less likely than
male judges to leave active status. The hazard ratio on Female in Model 1 indicates that
the rate of voluntary departure from active service for female judges is 37.9% less than
for male judges (holding all other variables constant). One can speculate about this
result—perhaps women find the job more interesting or become senile later in life, and
thus are less likely to find judging burdensome, or perhaps our control variables do not
fully account for differential opportunity costs—but we do not have explanation.
In all three models, the hazard ratios for Age and Experience are greater than 1
(and significant at the 1% level), indicating that judges with greater age and judicial
experience are more likely to leave active status. This result is consistent with the
hypothesis that older judges grow tired of judging—either because judging becomes
more difficult at advanced age (the Age Effect) or because judging becomes more tedious
with experience (the Boredom Effect).
Most important, we find that judges respond strongly to incentives created by the
Rule of 80. In the three models of Table 4, the hazard ratio on Rule80 is greater than 1
(significant at the 1% level). In the year a judge meets the Rule of 80 and the year after,
the judge is much more likely to take senior status. The magnitude of the hazard ratio is
also large. In Model 1, for example, the hazard ratio for Rule80 is 12.22, indicating that
judges who have recently qualified for full retirement pay are 1,122% more likely to take
senior status than the baseline judge hazard rate. The results provide strong evidence that
the Rule of 80 does in fact cause judges to withdraw from active status, consistent with
Yoon (2005, 2006).
We also find evidence about the relationship between judicial ability and
retirement. In Model 2, the hazard ratio on Low Publication Rate is less than 1 and


23

For discussions of the distributions of citation and publication rates for appellate judges, see, e.g., Choi &
Gulati (2004); Farber (2005).
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significant at the 10% level, indicating that less productive judges are generally less
likely to leave the federal bench (perhaps because of lower opportunity costs). In
contrast, the hazard ratio on Rule80 x Low Publication Rate is greater than 1 and
significant at the 1% level. The hazard ratio for the sum of Low Publication Rate +
Rule80 x Low Publication Rate is equal to 2.10 (and significant at the 5% level),
indicating the Rule of 80 has a particularly strong effect in getting Low Publication Rate
judges to depart from active status. These results are consistent with the time-server
model: judges who do not work hard remain in office (rather than taking a higher-paying
but more challenging private sector job) up until they can make more money and work
even less hard by taking senior status.
In Model 3, the hazard ratio on Low Positive Citations is less than 1 and
significant at the 1% level, indicating that judges with Low Positive Citations (and thus
lower opinion quality) are generally less likely to leave the federal bench (perhaps again
because of lower opportunity costs). In contrast, the hazard ratio on Rule80 x Low
Positive Citations is greater than 1 and significant at the 5% level. The hazard ratio for
the sum of Low Positive Citations + Rule80 x Low Positive Citations is equal to 1.03 but
is not significantly different from zero. These results are consistent with but weaker than
the results for low publication rate. Low-citation judges, like low publication-rate judges,
remain in office rather than take more challenging private sector jobs, but they are no
more likely than other judges to retire when the Rule of 80 kicks in.
Finally, we looked at low affirmance rates (Model 4). In the model, we include
an indicator variable for whether the judge’s Affirmance Rate is at the 75th percentile or
lower for our sample judges (Low Affirmance Rate). As with Models 2 and 3, we
estimate Models 4 only for those judges still active at the beginning of 2003 to avoid
possible endogeneity problems with Low Affirmance Rate, which is determined based on
opinions published in 2001 and 2002. The hazard ratio on judges with low affirmance
rates is above 1 (significant at the 10% level). This suggests that Low Affirmance Rate
judges are more likely to exit than ordinary judges. There are two possibilities here.
First, it may be that being reversed is a particularly unpleasant experience (anecdotally at
least, judges do not like being reversed). It stands to reason then that those who find the
job less rewarding will be those more likely to exit to other opportunities. The second
possibility is that the low affirmance judges are the subset of judges who are more willing
to take risks – that is, to write the kinds of opinions that push the envelope and risk
reversal. These judges may well be the better judges and, assuming that the market
recognizes this, will be the ones with better private sector options. We find some clues
into which of these possibilities is at play when we look at the interaction with the Rule80
variable.
With the interaction with Rule80, we see a hazard ratio below 1 (significant at the
5% level), telling us that these low-affirmance judges are less likely to be impacted by the
Rule of 80. That, in turn, suggests that judges who are willing to court reversal more, at
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the district court level, are of the more engaged type (intellects).24 The hazard ratio for
the sum of Low Affirmance Rate + Rule80 x Low Affirmance Rate is equal to 0.83 but is
not significantly different from zero.25
5.2.

The Rule of 80 and Other Judicial Characteristics

We examine a number of other judicial characteristics that may affect how the
Rule of 80 affects individual judges. We first divide our sample of judges based on a
proxy for the engagement a particular judge has with the job of judging. Our proxy looks
to whether a judge hires one-term clerks (who typically come from top law schools) or
uses clerks who stay with the judge for multiple terms. We assume that judges who use
one-term clerks are more inclined to expend effort training clerks or, alternatively, do not
rely on clerks as much and thus do not find having inexperienced clerks as costly. We
classify a judge as using either one-term or multiple-term clerks (Multiple-Term Clerks)
by examining each judge’s hiring patterns from 1996 to 2000.26 We use Model 1 of
Table 4 as our base model and add a variable for Multiple-Term Clerks as well as an
interaction term between Rule of 80 and Multiple-Term Clerks. We report the results as
Model 1 of Table 5.
We construct a second model to examine whether judges who hire clerks from top
school differ from other judges. We divide our sample of judges based on the fraction of
their clerks that came from a top 15 law school (as assessed from 1996 to 2000). We
define a Non-Top School Clerk Judge as a judge who has a fraction of top school clerks
that is at the 75th percentile or lower for the judges in our sample. We use Model 1 of
Table 4 as our base model and add a variable for Non-Top School Clerk as well as an
interaction term between Rule of 80 and Non-Top School Clerks. We report the results
as Model 2 of Table 5.
We construct a third model to address the possibility that judges with a high net
worth may not respond to financial incentives to take senior status as much as judges
with a lower net worth. We define Large Net Worth as equal to 1 if the judge’s net worth
is at the 75th percentile or greater for all judges in the sample ($1.18 million) and 0
otherwise. We use Model 1 of Table 4 as our base model and add Large Net Worth and
interaction terms between Large Net Worth and Rule80 and Post-Rule80 to assess
whether a pre-existing high net worth diminishes the importance of the Rule of 80 in the
decision by a judge to leave active status. Model 4 of Table 5 reports the results.


24

A possible selection effect may also occur. Those low affirmance judges who find reversal unpleasant
may have exited the judiciary prior to reaching the Rule of 80. Those low affirmance judges who remain
up to the Rule of 80 may consist of the more risk-taking and engaged judges.
25
We calculated the average affirmances per appeal for the 2001 to 2002 period for each of our district
judges based on all appealed cases, including both published and unpublished decisions (termed
“Affirmances Per Appeal”). As a robustness test, we re-estimated Model 4 replacing Affirmance Rate with
Affirmances Per Appeal and Rule 80 x Affirmance Rate with Rule 80 x Affirmances Per Appeal.
Unreported, the hazard ratios on Affirmances Per Appeal and Rule 80 x Affirmances Per Appeal were not
significantly different from zero.
26
If a judge has one single-term clerk and one multi-term clerk, we code that as a multi-term clerk judge.
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In Model 1, the hazard ratios for Multiple-Term Clerks and Rule80 x MultipleTerm Clerks are not significantly different from zero. We find no evidence that a judge’s
preference for short-term or long-term clerks is correlated with the general decision to
leave active status and the specific influence of reaching the Rule of 80. Multiple-Term
Clerks include judges with both two-year clerks and more permanent clerks. To test the
separate importance of permanent clerks, we replace Multiple Term Clerks and Rule80 x
Multiple Term Clerks with an indicator variable for a judge with permanent clerks
(Permanent Clerks) and a Rule80 x Permanent Clerks interaction term.27 Unreported, the
hazard ratios on Permanent Clerks and Rule80 x Permanent Clerks are not significant at
conventional levels. The hazard ratio on Rule80 x Permanent Clerks is greater than 1
(indicating judges with permanent clerks are more likely to retire upon hitting the Rule of
80) but significant at only the 15.3% level.
In Model 2, the hazard ratio on Non-Top School Clerks is less than 1 and
significant at the 10% level, indicating that judges with Non-Top School Clerks are
generally less likely to leave the federal bench. In contrast, the hazard ratio on Rule80 x
Non-Top School Clerks is greater than 1 and significant at the 5% level. The hazard ratio
for the sum of Non-Top School Clerks + Rule80 x Non-Top School Clerks is equal to
1.51 and is significant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with the Rule of 80
having a particularly strong effect in getting judges who utilize non-top law school clerks
to retire.
Lastly, Model 3 provides evidence for a Wealth Effect: judges with a high net
worth do not respond as strongly to reaching the Rule of 80. While the hazard ratio on
Rule80 (for judges of all wealth levels) is greater than 1 (significant at the 1% level), the
Rule80 x Large Net Worth interaction term has a hazard ratio below 1 (significant at the
10% level). The hazard ratio for Large Net Worth + Rule80 x Large Net Worth is equal
to 0.599 (significant at the 5% level). This indicates that Large Net Worth judges have a
higher propensity to leave office before they hit the Rule of 80, but a lower propensity to
take senior status once they hit the Rule of 80 compared with judges with lower net worth
who reach the Rule of 80. The Wealth Effect shows the disadvantages of using financial
carrots to encourage judges to leave office or reduce their caseload. Rich judges can
afford to leave office if they do not enjoy it (which is good), but are hard to force out
when they get old (which is bad).

5.3.

Political Timing Effects

Federal district judges of the opposite party to the President’s party may seek to
remain in active status longer than they otherwise would have with a same-party
President. By remaining in active status, the judge is able to occupy a seat in the district,
reducing the number of seats available for the opposite-party President to fill. Once the
opposite-party President leaves office and is replaced by a same-party President, a judge
with political goals should be more inclined to leave office. We test for such a political
Timing Effect.


27

Two-year clerks are grouped with one-year clerks in this alternate specification as the base category.
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For our test, we use the hazard model from Model 1 of Table 4 (with both Judge
Characteristic variables and the Rule80 variable). We add Judge Democrat, defined as
equal to 1 if the judge was appointed by a Democratic President and 0 otherwise. Model
1 of Table 6 reports our results. During the time period of our study from 2000 to 2010,
the President changed from a Republican (Bush) to a Democrat (Obama) in early 2009.
We define the variable Obama as equal to 1 if the year in question is either 2009 or 2010
and 0 otherwise. We add Obama and an interaction term between Obama and Judge
Democrat to Model 1 of Table 6. Model 2 of Table 6 reports the results.
In both models of Table 6, the hazard ratio for Judge Democrat is less than 1
(significant at the 1% level), indicating that Democratic judges are less likely to take
senior status compared to their Republican counterparts. Judge Democrats are 30.8% less
likely to leave active status compared with Republican judges.
In Model 2, the hazard ratio on Obama is not significant. In contrast, the hazard
ratio for Obama x Judge Democrat is greater than 1 (and significant at the 5% level).
While Democratic judges are less likely to take senior status prior to Obama, this
relationship switches once Obama becomes president. With Obama as president,
Democratic judges are no longer less likely to leave compared with Republican judges.
The hazard ratio for Judge Democrat + Obama x Judge Democrat is equal to 1.182. Once
Obama is President, Democrat judges are 18.2% more likely to leave active service
compared with Republican judges.28 This pattern is consistent with a Timing Effect:
Democrat judges hold onto their seats while a Republican is President—in hope for a
shift to a Democrat president, whereupon they resign or take senior status.
Thus, the results are consistent with the worry that a real cost of the federal
retirement system is that it enables judges to delay retirement for partisan reasons. Our
findings are at odds with those of Yoon (2005, 2006) and Boylan (2004), but consistent
with those in prior papers such as Barrow and Zuk (19900 and Spriggs and Wahlbeck
(1995). A possible explanation for this difference is that our dataset is more recent than
their datasets, and that the judiciary has become more highly politicized in the last few
decades. Yoon’s dataset, in particular, extends for more than a hundred years, and so
recent trends may be masked.

5.4.

Weather Effects

A judge’s decision to leave active status may turn on the geographical location of
the district in which the judge sits. In particular, we hypothesize that judges from
districts with colder weather (and harsher winters) will be more likely to resign or take


28

The sum of Judge Democrat and Obama x Judge Democrat is not significant, indicating that we cannot
rule out the hypothesis that once Obama is President, Democrat and Republican judges have an equal
propensity to leave active service. Even equality, nonetheless, is a significant shift from the pre-Obama
time period in our study when Democrat judges are much less likely to retire compared with Republican
judges.
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senior status so that they can move to, or spend more time in, warmer climates.
For our test, we use the hazard model from Model 1 of Table 4 (with both Judge
Characteristic variables and the Rule80 variable). We add Cold Weather, defined as
equal to 1 if the judge is located in a cold weather district and 0 otherwise.29 Model 1 of
Table 7 reports our results. To Model 1 of Table 7, we add an interaction term between
Age and Cold Weather, reflecting the likely greater sensitivity of elderly people to harsh
climates. Model 2 of Table 7 reports the results.
In Model 1 of Table 7, the hazard ratio on Cold Weather is not significant. Cold
Weather districts in general do not have a significant effect on the propensity of judges to
leave active status. This makes sense, since these judges are the ones who chose to take
jobs in cold areas in the first place. Things change when these judges get older though.
In Model 2, the hazard ratio on Cold Weather is less than 1 and significant at the 5%
level. In contrast, the interaction term between Age and Cold Weather is greater than 1
and significant at the 5% level. When judges are younger, location in a cold weather
district is associated with an increased propensity to remain at the job as compared with
more mild weather districts. When the age of the judge is equal to the median age in our
sample (56.45 years), then a Cold Weather district corresponds with a 42.5% decreased
likelihood of departing from active status (and thus an increased likelihood of staying on
at the job). Remember, however, that judges under the age of 65 do not really have
much of an option to reduce their workload, unless they resign – and, if they do, they get
nothing in pension from the federal government. The more interesting effects are when
the judges get older and within the range of eligibility for their pensions.
When the age of the judge is equal to 70 years, a Cold Weather district
corresponds with a 18.8% increased likelihood of departing active status. With greater
age, continuing as a judge in a cold weather district becomes increasingly less
attractive—sunny retirement locations beckon seductively.30
The lesson is that when assessing a judge’s incentive to resign or take senior
status, one must take into account all factors that relate to the attractiveness of work and
the magnitude of opportunity costs. Work impinges on opportunities to travel or move


29

We treat the following districts as cold weather districts: C.D. Illinois, D Kansas, D Maine, D Mass, D.
Alaska, D. Colorado, D. Connecticut, D. Delaware, D. District Columbia, D. Idaho, D. Maryland, D.
Minnesota, D. Montana, D. Nebraska, D. New Hampshire, D. New Jersey, D. North Dakota, D. Oregon, D.
Rhode Island, D. South Dakota, D. Utah, D. Vermont, D. Wyoming, E.D. + W.D. Missouri, E.D. Michigan,
E.D. Missouri, E.D. New York, E.D. Oklahoma, E.D. Pennsylvania, E.D. Texas, E.D. Virginia, E.D.
Washington, E.D. Wisconsin, ED Tennessee, M.D. Pennsylvania, N.D. Illinois, N.D. Indiana, N.D. Iowa,
N.D. New York, N.D. Ohio, N.D. Oklahoma, N.D. West Virginia, S.D. Illinois, S.D. Indiana, S.D. Iowa,
S.D. New York, S.D. Ohio, S.D. West Virginia, W.D. Michigan, W.D. Missouri, W.D. New York, W.D.
Oklahoma, W.D. Pennsylvania, W.D. Virginia, W.D. Washington, or W.D. Wisconsin.
30
In theory, a judge who takes senior status can move from a cold location to a sunnier one. However, the
sunny location has to have a need and the Chief Justice has to approve the assignment. There are examples
of judges moving, such as Judge Aldisert of the Third Circuit, who moved his chambers to Santa Barbara
for health reasons. See Stras & Scott (2007; 453) (noting the large number of cases from outside his circuit
that Judge Aldisert has appeared on). While we do not have data on how common such practices are, our
anecdotal impression is that they are rare.
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one’s residence; for older judges in colder areas of the countries, this cost may be
significant.

5.5. Taking Senior Status Versus Resignation
Hazard models have a binary structure. The dependent variable is the number of
years before an event occurs. In each year, the event either occurs or does not occur;
there can be no third possibility. For that reason, we have treated the event as “voluntary
departure” even though judges can voluntarily depart in two ways: through resignation
and through taking senior status.
However, there are differences between these two types of departure. When a
judge resigns, she leaves the bench and may take a new job as a practicing lawyer
without losing her pension if she satisfies the Rule of 80. When a judge takes senior
status, she stays on the bench. She may not obtain a new job; instead, she will continue
to hear cases albeit her caseload will be reduced. In addition, she opens up a slot for the
president to fill, thus increasing (compared to resignation) representation of her party on
the bench if she takes senior status while a same-party president is in office.
To test the differences between resignation and taking senior status, we use a
multinomial logit model.31 The dependent variable Outcome1 is equal to 0 if the judge
stays in active service, 1 if the judge takes senior status, and 2 if the judge resigns in any
given year. The model is estimated on judge-year data. A multinomial logit model is
used with robust errors clustered by judge. The model is as follows:
Outcome1i = α + ß1iFemalei + ß2iBlacki + ß3iOther Racei
+ ß4iAgei + ß5iExperiencei + ß6iPrior Judgei
+ ß7iPrior Prosecutori + ß8iPrior Private Practicei
+ ß9iTop Schooli + ß10iRule80i + ß11iLarge Net Worthi
+ ß12iRule80 x Large Net Worthi + ß13iJudge Democrati
+ ß14iObamai + ß15iObama x Judge Democrati
+ ß16iCold Weatheri + ß17iAge x Cold Weatheri + εi
Table 8 reports our results. We saw before that women are less likely to depart
from active status than men are; we see in Table 7 that women who do depart from active
status tend to take senior status rather than resign. A possible reason for this is that
women enjoy the job of judging more than their male counterparts. Or it could be that
they have fewer opportunities in the private sector.
Table 8 also complicates our results for age. The hazard model indicated that
older judges are more likely to depart from active status than younger judges are. The
multinomial logit model suggests that older judges are more likely to take senior status

31

The difference between the two is muddied by the fact that a judge might “retire” in year 1 and then
subsequently “resign” in year 2 in order to avoid the minimum 25 percent caseload or to enter private
practice. We treat these delayed resignations as retirements.
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than to remain on active status, but they are less likely to resign than to remain on active
status. These results suggest that judges who like judging remain in office; when they
become old, they prefer judging on a reduced caseload to resigning and entering private
practice or stopping work. The reason for what we are seeing may be that beyond a
certain age, these older judges do not have private sector options (or, even if those
options exist, they do not want them). Thus, the pension system does not necessarily
eliminate incompetent judges; it just ensures that their caseloads are reduced.
However, there is also evidence for the Boredom Effect. Those with Prior Judge
or Prior Prosecutor experience are more likely to resign than to remain on active status,
and less likely to take senior status. Also there is an Opportunity Costs Effect: those with
Prior Private Practice are more likely to resign, which allows them to go back to private
practice and earn money, and less likely to take senior status, which does not.32
Judges who satisfy the Rule of 80 are more likely to take senior status than to
remain on active status, but they are less likely to resign. The first result is predictable,
the second is puzzling. A judge who resigns receives her full pension, so one would
expect a judge who satisfies the Rule of 80 to be more likely to resign than to remain on
active status. After all, doing no work for full pay seems preferable to doing some work
for the same pay. A possible explanation for the result we find may be that there are
significant status and privilege benefits associated with being a judge. A judge who is
old enough to satisfy the Rule of 80 may be too old to obtain (or enjoy) lucrative work in
the private sector, so she may as well take senior status and retain the title and other
accoutrements of power.
Wealthy judges are more likely to take senior status than to remain on active
status; they are no more or less likely to resign than to remain on active status. These
results weakly support the Wealth Effect: wealthy judges have less incentive to resign so
as to earn money in the private sector.
The Timing Effect exists but only for taking senior status, not for resignation.
This is consistent with a story about political incentives. Democratic judges take senior
status rather than resign so that they continue to exert influence on policy while opening
up a slot for the president to fill. With the judges who resign though – that is, the ones
who opt out of the judiciary altogether (perhaps because of ill health or outside financial
opportunities), politics is essentially irrelevant in determining their decision.
Finally, the Cold Weather Effect is important for older judges who choose to
resign. Judges who are based in cold climates are more likely to resign as they grow
older rather than stay in active status. In contrast, we find no increased propensity to
become a senior judge for judges based in cold climates as they grow older.


32

One recent example is the Chicago lawyer, Mark Filip. He was a partner at the law firm of Skadden
Arps Meagher & Flom prior to becoming a district court judge. He subsequently resigned his judgeship
and moved to a position as Deputy Attorney General in the Bush administration, after which, he took up a
partnership at the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis. See Kirkland & Ellis Biographical Sketches (available at
http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&itemID=9711 ).
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5.6. Productive and Unproductive Senior Judges
Not all judges who choose to become senior are the same. Some senior judges
continue at a high level of productivity, sometimes taking on even greater caseloads than
when they were active judges. Other senior judges continue to draw their federal pay but
reduce drastically their workload.33 To assess workload, we collect data from Westlaw
on each judge’s caseload for the years 2001 to 2009. For each judge who took senior
status, we compute the percentage change in their average caseload from their activejudge to senior-judge years (excluding the year in which she took senior status).
Panel A of Table 9 provides summary statistics for the senior status judges. The
mean (median) drop in workload for a senior judge was 40.1% (51.2%). A wide
variation exists in the change in workload. Senior judges at the 25th percentile dropped
their workload by 67.7%; senior judges at the 75th percentile dropped their workload by
only 24.9%.
There is an initial puzzle. If a judge doesn’t like to work, it makes sense for her to
take senior status and a reduced workload (or to resign). But if a judge likes to work,
why would she take senior status with a heavy load rather than remain on active status?
The most likely answer is that (1) the judge wants only a modest reduction in her
caseload; (2) she wants to jettison the more boring cases such as the pro se claims (senior
judges can choose to avoid certain categories of cases34); (3) she wants the financial
benefits of senior status; or (4) she wants to open a vacancy for the President to fill.
We assess whether the decision to become a low workload senior judge is
different from the decision to become a high workload senior judge. We categorize our
judges based on whether they are at or below the 75th percentile in terms of percentage
change in average caseload (Small Workload Senior Judge) or above the 75th percentile
(High Workload Senior Judge). So a High Workload Senior Judge is a judge who
reduced her caseload by less than 24.9% (corresponding to the 75th percentile) from their
average caseload in their active-judge years.
We estimate a multinomial logit model with the same independent variables as the
model in Table 8. For the dependent variable we use Outcome2 defined as equal to 0 if
the judge stays in active service, 1 if the judge takes senior status with a small decline in
caseload, 2 if the judge takes senior status with a large decline in caseload, and 3 if the
judge resigns in any given year. We assume that when judges choose to take senior
status, they also make a choice about the workload they expect to take on when they
continue as a senior judge. The model is estimated on judge-year data. Errors are
clustered by judge. The model is as follows:


33

This wide variation in the caseloads of senior judges was noted by Yoon (2005;522) who used survey
data. Yoon observed that there was significant variation among the caseloads taken by senior district court
judges; with thirty-five percent carrying loads between twenty-six percent and fifty percent of a full load
and twenty-three percent reporting that they had a full caseload.
34
See Block (2007).
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Outcome2i = α + ß1iFemalei + ß2iBlacki + ß3iOther Racei
+ ß4iAgei + ß5iExperiencei + ß6iPrior Judgei
+ ß7iPrior Prosecutori + ß8iPrior Private Practicei
+ ß9iTop Schooli + ß10iRule80i + ß11iLarge Net Worthi
+ ß12iRule80 x Large Net Worthi + ß13iJudge Democrati
+ ß14iObamai + ß15iObama x Judge Democrati
+ ß16iCold Weatheri + ß17iAge x Cold Weatheri + εi
Panel B of Table 9 reports the results. The coefficient on Female and Black are
both negative and significant (at the 10% and 1% levels respectively) for High Workload
Senior Judges. In contrast the coefficient on Female and Black are not significantly
different from zero for Low Workload Senior Judges. In other words, Female and Black
judges who leave active status are less likely to serve as High Workload Senior Judges
than other judges who leave active status. For female judges, this finding cuts against the
hypothesis we had suggested based on earlier findings (where we found, for example,
that female judges were less likely to resign than their male counterparts). That
hypothesis had been the female judges perhaps found the job of judging more interesting.
Their workload choices upon taking senior status, however, suggest otherwise.
The coefficient on Rule80 is not significantly different from zero for High
Workload Senior Judges. In contrast the coefficient on Rule80 is positive and significant
at the 5% level for Low Workload Senior Judges. In other words, when a judge satisfies
the Rule of 80, she is more likely to become a Low Workload Senior Judge than a judge
who does not satisfy the Rule of 80 (obviously so, since there is no option to become a
low workload judge when one has not satisfied the Rule of 80). By contrast, High
Workload judges are not motivated by the Rule of 80 – unsurprisingly, since these judges
are not motivated by the desire to consume more leisure by reducing workloads, the
timing of their choices to take senior status appear largely unrelated to satisfying the Rule
of 80.
One might wonder whether the High Workload judges who are unmotivated by
the Rule of 80, are instead motivated by the Political Timing Effect. That turns out not to
be the case. The effect of Obama becoming president on the relative propensity of
Democrat and Republican judges to take senior status is driven primarily by judges who
decided to become Low Workload Senior judges. While the coefficient on Judge
Democrat is negative and significant at the 1% level for Low Workload Senior Judges,
the coefficient on Obama x Judge Democrat is positive and significant at the 1% level.
The coefficients on Democrat and Obama x Judge Democrat, in contrast, are not
significantly different from zero for High Workload Senior Judges. Democratic judges
who otherwise would prefer senior status but choose to remain in active status in hopes
for a change in the presidency may artificially suppress a preference for a lower
workload. Once they do in fact take senior status (once Obama becomes president), these
judges will give full effect to their preference for a low workload.
Put simply, the High Workload judges not only do a great deal of work for free
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(that is, even after they could get the same salary for no work or a lot less work), they
also happen to be less political. These judges are the intellects, who derive utility from
judging.

6. Conclusion: Judicial Buyouts?
Judges respond to incentives, including financial incentives, just like everyone
else. The empirical evidence of their responses to the incentives created by the
retirement system confirms this claim. The system seems to be designed to usher out
elderly judges by offering them no compensation for doing judicial work once they
satisfy the Rule of 80—and it works as advertised. But the system has imperfections, as
we have seen.
Wealthy judges are less sensitive to these financial incentives than poorer judges
are, while judges with high opportunity costs are more sensitive to them. Judges with
partisan goals can manipulate the timing of their retirement in order to advance those
goals. However, some (but not all) of our results suggest reasons for optimism regarding
how the system is working. In particular, we see that the time-server judges (as
contrasted with the intellect-type judges) are highly motivated by the Rule of 80.
Roughly speaking, we see this result hold up across all four of the proxies for judge type
(citations, publications, short-term clerks, clerks from top schools) that we used. The flip
side is that the intellect-type judges are relatively unmotivated by the financial and leisure
inducements of the Rule of 80. The retirement system, by offering financial incentives
least attractive to the most talented judges, therefore eliminates a lot of the chaff while
preserving some of the wheat.
The current buyout system could be tinkered with and possibly improved though.
If we are correct that judges segment into different types; and there are some who are
more engaged with the job and others who are relatively uninterested in the job and are
biding time until they can take a cushy retirement, it may make sense to reduce the
pension penalty for a judge to leave prior to age 65. At a younger age, there may be a
greater range of outside opportunities available to an ex-federal judge. If judges who are
bored with the job can leave earlier without suffering quite as much of a pension penalty,
they may be able to take on employment that suits them better and where they could
contribute more to society (for example, in the private sector or an academic position).
That, in turn, would make it possible for someone else, who was perhaps more engaged
with the job of judging, to take on the judgeship.
The current system also assumes that older judges slow down but do not become
less competent; senior status enables them to work less, while still contributing to the
judiciary and permitting the President to appoint a replacement who can take up the
slack. But if they become incompetent as well as slow, a better system would improve
the incentive to resign. For example, judges could be given the choice between
remaining on active status with a full load or resigning with full pay—and no
intermediate senior status choice. Under this system, less talented judges would be
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significantly more likely to leave office.
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Table 2
Circuit
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
D.C.
Total

Freq.
28
59
53
50
70
61
46
39
85
34
58
13
596

Percent
4.7
9.9
8.9
8.4
11.7
10.2
7.7
6.5
14.3
5.7
9.7
2.2
100.0

Judge Status
Death
Resigned
Senior
Elevated
Impeached
Still Active
Total

Freq.
12
12
225
14
1
332
596

Percent
2.0
2.0
37.8
2.4
0.2
55.7
100.0

Year Departed (if
Resigned or Took Senior
Status)
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total

Freq.
25
20
22
20
26
22
20
27
40
15
237

Percent
10.6
8.4
9.3
8.4
11.0
9.3
8.4
11.4
16.9
6.3
100.0
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Table 3
N

Mean

p25

Median

p75

Standard
Deviation

Female

596

0.225

0

0

0

0.418

Black

596

0.114

0

0

0

0.318

Other Race

596

0.057

0

0

0

0.232

Age2000

596

56.451

51

56

61

7.385

Experience2000

596

8.156

3

7

12

6.375

Prior Judge

596

0.435

0

0

1

0.496

Prior Prosecutor

596

0.091

0

0

0

0.287

Prior Private Practice

596

0.403

0

0

1

0.491

Top School

596

0.136

0

0

0

0.343

Publications Rate

428

0.025

0.005

0.012

0.026

0.036

Positive Citations

573

1.776

0.750

1.355

2.171

1.934

Affirmance Rate

573

0.917

0.875

0.952

1.000

0.124

Multiple-Term Clerks

559

0.798

1.000

1.000

1.000

0.402

Fraction of Top School Clerks

512

0.380

0.000

0.333

0.667

0.349

Net Worth ($ mill)

553

1.120

0.280

0.590

1.182

1.971

Judge Democrat

596

0.532

0

1

1

0.499

Cold Weather

596

0.485

0

0

1

0.500

Variable
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Table 4: Rule80 and Judge Quality (Cox Proportional Hazards Model)
Model 1
0.621*
(0.138)

Model 2
0.597*
(0.153)

Model 3
0.625*
(0.140)

Model 4
0.627*
(0.141)

Black

0.850
(0.240)

1.027
(0.350)

0.885
(0.260)

0.908
(0.267)

Other Race

0.831
(0.277)

0.619
(0.337)

0.762
(0.267)

0.760
(0.265)

Age

1.099**
(0.0147)

1.142**
(0.0192)

1.117**
(0.0154)

1.113**
(0.0153)

Experience

1.043**
(0.0115)

1.049**
(0.0144)

1.040**
(0.0117)

1.040**
(0.0116)

Prior Judge

1.432
(0.403)

1.175
(0.399)

1.295
(0.372)

1.345
(0.390)

Prior Prosecutor

0.752
(0.293)

0.491
(0.253)

0.750
(0.294)

0.793
(0.310)

Prior Priv. Prac.

1.432
(0.398)

1.221
(0.410)

1.369
(0.387)

1.409
(0.401)

Top School

1.109
(0.219)

1.021
(0.254)

1.015
(0.206)

1.031
(0.209)

Rule80

12.22**
(1.792)

4.106**
(1.487)

6.562**
(1.803)

15.85**
(3.603)

Female

Low Pub. Rate

0.571+
(0.172)

Rule 80 x Low Pub. Rate

3.686**
(1.540)

Low Pos. Cit.

0.494**
(0.129)

Rule 80 x Low Pos. Cit.

2.084*
(0.676)
1.539+
(0.385)

Low Aff. Rate

0.538*
(0.159)
N
4617
2923
3773
3773
Log Likelihood
-1151.1
-680.6
-1105.3
-1106.4
Pseudo-R2
0.206
0.226
0.203
0.202
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses. Models 2 through 4 are estimated only for
those judges who were active at the beginning of 2003 to avoid possible endogeneity issues with Low
Publication Rate, Low Positive Citation, and Low Affirmance Rate that are defined based on opinions
Rule 80 x Low Aff. Rate
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published in 2001 and 2002.
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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Table 5: Rule80 and Other Factors (Cox Proportional Hazards Model)
Model 1
0.621*
(0.142)

Model 2
0.591*
(0.143)

Model 3
0.549**
(0.125)

Black

0.813
(0.238)

0.759
(0.241)

0.843
(0.240)

Other Race

0.851
(0.284)

0.857
(0.287)

1.110
(0.365)

Age

1.106**
(0.0152)

1.100**
(0.0158)

1.139**
(0.0177)

Experience

1.039**
(0.0118)

1.040**
(0.0123)

1.062**
(0.0145)

Prior Judge

1.497
(0.431)

1.522
(0.512)

1.738+
(0.545)

Prior Prosecutor

0.821
(0.324)

0.949
(0.406)

1.237
(0.527)

Prior Private Practice

1.533
(0.438)

1.499
(0.497)

1.644
(0.517)

Top School

1.145
(0.232)

1.115
(0.251)

1.034
(0.213)

Rule80

8.126**
(3.230)

6.198**
(1.925)

14.45**
(2.704)

Multiple-Term Clerks

1.139
(0.368)

Rule80 x Multiple-Term Clerks

1.520
(0.641)

Female

Non Top School Clerks

0.611+
(0.176)

Rule80 x Non Top School Clerks

2.465*
(0.875)

Large Net Worth

1.991*
(0.542)

Rule80 x Large Net Worth

0.301**
(0.0984)
4300
-1066.7
0.223

N
4308
3942
Log Likelihood
-1132.7
-1024.3
Pseudo-R2
0.203
0.207
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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Table 6 Political Party and Obama (Cox Proportional Hazards Model)
Model 1
0.692
(0.156)

Model 2
0.707
(0.160)

Black

1.003
(0.291)

0.994
(0.288)

Other Race

0.953
(0.318)

0.956
(0.319)

Age

1.111**
(0.0156)

1.109**
(0.0157)

Experience

1.029*
(0.0129)

1.032*
(0.0131)

Prior Judge

1.392
(0.391)

1.347
(0.379)

Prior Prosecutor

0.706
(0.273)

0.692
(0.267)

Prior Private Practice

1.406
(0.391)

1.378
(0.384)

Top School

1.168
(0.232)

1.204
(0.240)

Rule80

11.69**
(1.718)

11.39**
(1.681)

Judge Democrat

0.657**
(0.105)

0.543**
(0.0989)

Female

2.176*
(0.731)

Obama x Judge Democrat

Obama
N
4617
Log Likelihood
-1147.5
Pseudo-R2
0.208
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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4.13e-13
(0.000000995)
4617
-1144.4
0.211

Table 7: Cold Weather (Cox Proportional Hazards Model)
Model 1
0.619*
(0.138)

Model 2
0.617*
(0.137)

Black

0.850
(0.241)

0.861
(0.243)

Other Race

0.842
(0.282)

0.863
(0.288)

Age

1.099**
(0.0147)

1.075**
(0.0184)

Experience

1.044**
(0.0116)

1.044**
(0.0116)

Prior Judge

1.451
(0.412)

1.679+
(0.500)

Prior Prosecutor

0.753
(0.294)

0.928
(0.373)

Prior Private Practice

1.453
(0.410)

1.622+
(0.472)

Top School

1.094
(0.221)

1.089
(0.220)

Rule80

12.19**
(1.790)

12.07**
(1.781)

Cold Weather

1.046
(0.145)

0.0280*
(0.0477)

Female

Age x Cold Weather
N
4617
Log Likelihood
-1151.0
Pseudo-R2
0.206
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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1.055*
(0.0266)
4617
-1148.7
0.208

Table 8: Senior Status Versus Resignation (Multinomial Logit Model)
1 = Senior
-0.759*
(0.316)

2 = Resign
-0.882
(0.642)

Black

0.122
(0.367)

-0.369
(1.002)

Other Race

0.186
(0.414)

-0.442
(1.319)

Age

0.188**
(0.0413)

-0.148**
(0.0385)

Experience

0.0763**
(0.0194)

0.0390
(0.0794)

Prior Judge

0.562
(0.396)

18.39**
(2.492)

Prior Prosecutor

-0.183
(0.581)

19.16**
(2.325)

Prior Private Practice

0.556
(0.393)

18.35**
(2.330)

Top School

0.109
(0.267)

0.355
(0.943)

Rule80

3.406**
(0.257)

-29.00**
(0.627)

Large Net Worth

0.822*
(0.346)

0.673
(0.818)

Rule80 x Large Net Worth

-1.738**
(0.478)

0.912
(0.765)

Judge Democrat

-0.857**
(0.220)

0.533
(0.881)

Obama x Judge Democrat

1.498**
(0.461)

-1.068
(1.647)

Obama

-0.741*
(0.346)

1.315
(1.367)

Cold Weather

-1.639
(3.317)

-11.03**
(2.896)

Age x Cold Weather

0.0251
(0.0499)

0.163**
(0.0463)

Constant

-17.62**

-16.19

Female
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(2.825)
(.)
N
4384
Log Likelihood
-532.6
Standard errors in parentheses. Base category for the multinomial logit is active status. The model is
estimated on judge-year data. Errors are clustered by judge.
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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Table 9: Productive and Unproductive Senior Judges
Panel A
N

Mean

p25

Median

p75

Standard
Deviation

Pre-Senior Load

142

411.4

314.5

425.8

493.0

155.5

Post-Senior Load

142

211.2

113.5

192.5

301.3

135.6

Variable

Change in Load
142
-0.401
-0.677
-0.512
-0.249
0.768
Change in Load is defined as Post-Senior Load minus Pre-Senior Load divided by Pre-Senior Load. PreSenior Load, Post-Senior Load, and Change in Load are reported only for judges who became senior and
have a positive load while a senior judge.

Panel B: Multinomial Logit Model
1 = High
Workload Senior
Judge

2 = Low
Workload Senior
Judge

3 = Resign

Female

-1.769+
(1.006)

-0.643
(0.486)

-0.539
(0.709)

Black

-36.15**
(0.422)

-0.416
(0.515)

0.0808
(1.015)

Other Race

-0.401
(1.047)

-0.00349
(0.606)

-2.403+
(1.421)

Age

0.167**
(0.0463)

0.190**
(0.0591)

-0.158**
(0.0560)

Experience

-0.0188
(0.0485)

-0.0222
(0.0349)

0.00235
(0.0445)

Prior Judge

0.516
(1.077)

0.285
(0.755)

18.91**
(2.730)

Prior Prosecutor

-35.40**
(1.070)

0.184
(0.881)

20.10**
(2.958)

Prior Private Practice

0.926
(1.056)

0.785
(0.756)

19.05**
(2.686)

Top School

0.226
(0.596)

0.262
(0.451)

-0.267
(0.738)

Rule80

0.235
(0.182)

0.408*
(0.179)

-35.62**
(0.669)

Large Net Worth

-0.175
(0.503)

-1.047*
(0.407)

0.921
(0.883)

Rule80 x Large Net Worth

0.151
(0.325)

0.0479
(0.291)

-0.868
(0.617)
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Judge Democrat

-0.574
(0.528)

-1.339**
(0.360)

-0.237
(0.766)

Obama x Judge Democrat

-0.0356
(1.352)

1.529**
(0.286)

0.132
(1.207)

Obama

-3.922**
(0.998)

-38.72**
(0.242)

-0.811
(0.852)

Cold Weather

-6.110
(3.721)

-3.521
(4.087)

-8.817+
(4.868)

Age x Cold Weather

0.0883
(0.0592)

0.0531
(0.0650)

0.129+
(0.0778)

Constant

-12.51**
(2.847)

-12.68**
(3.590)

-13.54
(.)
N
4398
Log Likelihood
-1914.4
Standard errors in parentheses. Base category for the multinomial logit is active status. The model is
estimated on judge-year data. Errors are clustered by judge.
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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Appendix: Variable Definitions
Variable
Female

Description
Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge is female and 0 if the
judge is male.

Black

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge is black and 0 otherwise.

Other Race

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge is Hispanic, Asian, or
racial minority other than Black and 0 otherwise.

Age2000

Age of the judge in the year 2000.

Age

Age of the judge in the year in question.

Experience2000

Number of years between the year of appointment for the judge in question
and the year 2000.

Experience

Number of years between the year of appointment for the judge in question
and the year in question.

Prior Judge

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s immediate prior position
before appointment was as a magistrate judge or a judge in another court
system and 0 otherwise.

Prior Prosecutor

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s immediate prior position
before appointment was as a prosecutor and 0 otherwise.

Prior Private Practice

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s immediate prior position
before appointment was as in private practice and 0 otherwise.

Top School

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question graduated from
Harvard, Yale, or Stanford Law School and 0 otherwise.

Publication Rate

The average number of published opinions in 2001 and 2002 for the judge in
question as a fraction of the per judge number of filings for the district court
in which the judge sits.

Low Publication Rate

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s Publication Per Filing is
at the 75th percentile or lower for our sample judges or 0 otherwise.

Positive Citations

The average number of positive citations per opinion published in 2001 and
2002 for the judge.

Low Positive Citations

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s Positive Citations is at
the 75th percentile or lower for our sample judges or 0 otherwise.

Affirmance Rate

Number of non-overruled published opinions, including non-appealed
opinions, divided by the total number of published opinions for the judge in
question in 2001 and 2002.

Low Affirmance Rate

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s Affirmance Rate is at the
75th percentile or lower for our sample judges or 0 otherwise.
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Rule80

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge meets the rule of 80 in the
year in question or the year after the year in question and 0 otherwise.

Net Worth

Net worth of the judge (in millions of dollars)

Large Net Worth

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s net worth is at the 75th
percentile or greater for all judges in the sample ($1.18 million) and 0
otherwise.

Obama

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the year in question is 2009 or 2010
and 0 otherwise.

Democrat

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question was appointed
by a Democrat President and 0 otherwise.

Cold Weather

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge is located in the C.D.
Illinois, D Kansas, D Maine, D Mass, D. Alaska, D. Colorado, D.
Connecticut, D. Delaware, D. District Columbia, D. Idaho, D. Maryland, D.
Minnesota, D. Montana, D. Nebraska, D. New Hampshire, D. New Jersey, D.
North Dakota, D. Oregon, D. Rhode Island, D. South Dakota, D. Utah, D.
Vermont, D. Wyoming, E.D. + W.D. Missouri, E.D. Michigan, E.D. Missouri,
E.D. New York, E.D. Oklahoma, E.D. Pennsylvania, E.D. Texas, E.D.
Virginia, E.D. Washington, E.D. Wisconsin, ED Tennessee, M.D.
Pennsylvania, N.D. Illinois, N.D. Indiana, N.D. Iowa, N.D. New York, N.D.
Ohio, N.D. Oklahoma, N.D. West Virginia, S.D. Illinois, S.D. Indiana, S.D.
Iowa, S.D. New York, S.D. Ohio, S.D. West Virginia, W.D. Michigan, W.D.
Missouri, W.D. New York, W.D. Oklahoma, W.D. Pennsylvania, W.D.
Virginia, W.D. Washington, or W.D. Wisconsin and 0 otherwise.

President Same Party

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge is of the same political
party as the President for the year in question and 0 otherwise.

Salient

Fraction of cases published by the judge in 2001 and 2002 that involved
church and state, campaign finance, federalism, first amendment, and other
constitutional rights.

Circuit Quality

Out-of-circuit citations to majority opinions of appellate judges in circuit

Circuit GHP Distance

Distance between the district court judge in question’s political ideology and
the average Giles, Hettinger & Peppers (2001) score for the circuit court
judges

Circuit Diversity

Equality of Republican and Democratic appellate judges in circuit
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